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It took us some time to get a title agreed for this report, as we sought suggestions from 
colleagues in CRESR and further afield.  We decided in the end on this one because it 
seemed to capture our underlying argument: that the performance of what are sometimes 
referred to as 'volume' housebuilders in recent years has been marked by a very sharp 
increase in their levels of profits, and a much more modest increase in their 'volumes'.  We 
think an acknowledgement of this trend is too often missing from the perpetual head shaking 
analysis on what can be done so that more homes will be built in the future. This report is 
intended to bring into focus these recent trends in the performance of larger housebuilders, 
and their dominance in the industry as a whole.  We would be the first to acknowledge that 
more detailed analysis is required of the underlying processes within housebuilding, and how 
much leaks out of the sector, on dividends to shareholders.  We have only scratched the 
surface in a short report of this kind.  We are pleased to see that the Communities and Local 
Government Committee, for example, has recently launched an inquiry into the nature and 
capacity of the housebuilding sector.  We hope that this may be the start of a more thorough 
reappraisal of how housing supply can be enhanced through direct public investment as well 
as through the private market. 
We would like to express our gratitude to Dr. Stewart Smyth at the University of Sheffield for 
his scrutiny of our analysis of companies' accounts, to ensure we had a robust case to 
present.  Mervyn Jones of Yorkshire Housing and Hugh Owen of Riverside Housing 
Association also made helpful observations (in a personal capacity) on the direction of future 
policy.  We would like to thank Sarah Ward, Emma Smith and Louise South at CRESR for all 
their help in the production of this report.  We would also like to thank Professor David 
Robinson at CRESR for making funding available so that Tom Archer was able to complete 
his analysis of the financial data.  Any error or omissions that remain are, of course, solely 
our own responsibility. 
Tom Archer and Ian Cole, Sheffield, October 2016 
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Executive Summary 
There is widespread consensus that housing supply in the UK is not keeping pace 
with housing demand.  We suggest in this report that these debates have often failed 
to give sufficient attention to structural changes in the housebuilding industry.  If we 
focus on this factor, our analysis suggests that any national strategy which is largely 
dependent on the private market sector, as currently constituted, will be simply 
incapable of achieving the required uplift in housing output. 
Not only is the current regime for developing new housing highly unlikely to stem the 
long standing decline in output in the face of increasing demand; it is also unlikely 
that the geographical distribution of new developments will be aligned with the major 
local pressure points in high housing demand.   
In order to guard against volatility, housebuilders use landbanks to control the flow of 
new housing into local markets, and to strengthen their negotiating position with 
landowners.  The need for land leads some housebuilders to focus on the acquisition 
of smaller firms, in order to access their land banks.  This leads to a consolidation in 
the sector, and a concentration of market share by bigger firms.  The top ten 
housebuilders have increased their share of housing production from nine per 
cent in 1960 to 47 per cent by 2015.  In 1980 there were over 10,000 small and 
medium (SME) housebuilders, building 57 per cent of all housing.  In 2014 this 
had dropped to 2,800 firms delivering just 27 per cent of all output.  We think 
this process of consolidation matters, because larger firms are more concerned to 
maximise returns than increase output as an end in itself.   They may therefore be 
reluctant to increase the production of a good where ongoing scarcity is proving so 
conducive to enhanced profitability per unit.   
From 2012-15, the output of the nine largest private housebuilders grew by 33 
per cent.  Revenues increased by 76 per cent.  In the same time frame, profit 
before tax (prior to the removal of exceptional items and financing costs) rose 
by nearly 200 per cent for these nine firms.   Over a slightly longer period, 2010-
15, the profits before tax of the top five housebuilders increased by 473 per cent.  
End of year profits for the biggest five firms (after taxation, impairments and 
exceptional items are taken into account) increased from £372 million in 2010 
to over £2 billion by 2015 - an increase of over 480 per cent.  In their normal 
functions, significant surpluses are being generated by these firms.  Other priorities 
hold sway ahead of increasing volume.  The profit margin dominates, and investment 
is therefore directed to those sites and locations that are most likely to produce the 
best returns. 
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What happens to these surpluses?  In the aftermath of the financial crisis, one firm 
(Berkeley Group) chose to forgo paying dividends so it could reinvest in its core 
activities.  The strategies of the largest firms have changed markedly since then.  In 
2015, the biggest five housebuilders returned 43 per cent of their annual profits 
to shareholders, an amount totalling £936m.  This raises questions about the 
potential volume of new supply that could have been provided through 
reinvestment of at least some of this money. 
The Government has introduced some initiatives, such as Help to Buy, to stimulate 
the private housing market.  Help to Buy has so far generated a 14 per cent increase 
in supply, which is well short of the fundamental uplift in output that is required.  The 
risk with demand-side initiatives is that they end up simply subsidising households to 
afford high prices, and for a temporary period.  They can bring a short-term political 
dividend more readily than a significant long-term shift in increased supply.  
The failure of the private housebuilding sector to build in sufficient quantity is 
not some kind of temporary aberration, while the exigencies of the 2008 
financial crisis work through the system.  This failure is of long standing and is 
indeed integral to the business model that major housebuilders work with.  This 
process of financialisation, in which maximising shareholder returns takes 
precedence over increasing output or improving productivity is not, of course, unique 
to the housebuilding industry.  However, the ramifications of this emphasis on 
realising profits rather than maximising investment carries particular force in housing 
– not least for households struggling to gain access to affordable housing, those 
living in overcrowded and poor quality properties, and the increasing number of 
households experiencing homelessness.   
There are recent signs that the government is going to focusing more directly on 
housing supply in the future, and some new measures have been announced.  But 
there is scope for the government to do much more to increase investment by local 
authorities, housing associations and other non-profit bodies for housebuilding.  It 
needs the political will to do it.  This needs to go beyond easing access to loan 
finance and planning reforms.  This could involve measures over the use of reserves, 
rent policy, land supply, borrowing restrictions and moving the balance of housing 
subsidy away from demand and towards supply.  A wide range of economists have 
advised the government to borrow more for sustainable infrastructural investment at 
this juncture.  We think there is little reason why borrowing to invest in housing 
should be exempt from this process.  
On the basis of the evidence in this report about the structure, organisation 
and financial performance of the major housebuilders, the private sector alone 
will simply continue to fail to provide what is needed, and the gap between 
housing demand and supply will continue to grow larger. 
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 1 1. Introduction 
There is widespread (though not universal) consensus that housing supply in the UK 
is not keeping pace with housing demand.  As Sir Michael Lyons's 2014 review of UK 
housing put it: ‘We face the biggest housing crisis in a generation’ (Lyons, 2014).  
This stark assessment was effectively a statement of accepted wisdom, rather than 
an unusually dramatic or controversial verdict.  Lyon’s portentous warnings about low 
levels of housing output echoed many previous judgements along similar lines.  Ten 
years earlier, for example, Kate Barker (2004: 1) had suggested that it was not a 
‘realistic option’ to keep building at the current low rate.  The consequences would be 
greater homelessness, worsening affordability, social division, declining quality in 
public services and greater costs for businesses working in the UK.  These words 
were unheeded.  In 2004-2005, the year Barker’s report was published, 205,000 
houses were built in the UK.  In 2014-15, ten years later, annual output was 153,000.  
In fact housing completions have been steadily ratcheted down since the 1960s, 
reflecting in particular the declining role of the public sector in housebuilding activity. 
Our intention in this report is to suggest that, in these debates about housing supply, 
insufficient attention has been given to the structural changes taking place in the 
housebuilding industry itself.  These changes predate the 2008 financial crisis but 
have become amplified since then.  If we focus on this factor in housing supply, 
our analysis suggests that any national strategy which is largely dependent on 
the private market sector as currently constituted will be simply incapable of 
achieving the uplift needed in housing output. 
In a paper in 2014 we explored recent trends in housing supply in the context of 
post-crisis austerity (Archer and Cole, 2014), and offered some insights into the 
persistent failure of UK governments to achieve their own housing supply targets, in 
both good times and bad.  This report undertakes further analysis of the changing 
structure and financial performance of the private housebuilding industry, and 
provides an account of more recent trends. 
Our earlier paper focuses on the largest firms that had steadily increased their 
market share (Wellings, 2006).  In assessing the output and financial performance of 
these firms after the 2008 financial crisis, our analysis showed that the five biggest 
housebuilders, which provide for more than a third of all new housing, were 
prioritising their profitability ratios over increasing output. 
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This paper updates and extends our earlier analysis.  It examines whether the 
financial performance of the large housebuilders has continued to improve, as the 
financial shock of 2008 recedes; it considers whether the market share of the larger 
builders has diminished or increased as the housing market cycle moves on; it 
explores some of the early effects of government interventions since 2013 to 
stimulate housing demand; and it outlines some of the opportunity costs of this 
increased reliance on a financialised culture in the housebuilding sector, compared 
to a programme based on more direct public investment in housing.  In essence, we 
concur with the Prime Minister's recently expressed view that ‘where markets are 
dysfunctional, we should be prepared to intervene’ (May, 2016).  Our analysis in this 
report suggests that the market in new housing supply, and the industry responsible 
for it, is overdue proactive intervention in the public interest. 
In the next section we outline the nature and scale of the crisis in housing supply.  
This is followed by a more detailed exploration of the private housebuilding sector, 
and recent trends in output, revenue, profits and dividends.  We then review one of 
the measures introduced by the government in response to housing under-supply - 
the Help to Buy programme - and outline the new measures concerning housing 
supply that have recently been announced.  In conclusion, we offer some thoughts 
on how the level of housing output could be significantly increased in the future if the 
government's own ambitions are to be met. 
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2 2. A crisis of housing supply 
We have already noted that recent warnings about low levels of housing output are 
far from new.  Indeed, as Figure 1 below shows, after historic highs in output in the 
1960s, housing completions have been steadily declining.  This long-run downward 
trend in overall output reflects the sharp decrease in completions in the social 
housing sector since the 1970s. 
Figure 1: The long run decline in housing output in the UK 
 
Source: DCLG (2016a) 
The case for increasing housing supply has become increasingly persuasive as this 
historic decline in housebuilding has been set against significant annual increases in 
the number of additional households forming.  As shown in Figure 2, the gap 
between what we need to build and what we are building is growing larger year on 
year.  Changes in the size and speed of household formation and net migration have 
created major pressure on the existing housing stock (McDonald and Williams, 2014), 
compounding the existing backlog of housing need and demand.  This has led a 
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housebuilding of between 240,000 to 300,000 additional units a year (Holmans, 2011; 
KPMG and Shelter, 2015; Lyons, 2014; House of Lords Select Committee on 
Economic Affairs, 2016).  It can be seen from Figure 2 that completions in 2014-15 
fell nearly 100,000 short of even the lowest target output figure in this range.  The 
current government has a commitment to build a million new homes by 2020, though 
it is not entirely clear whether this is a target or an ‘aspiration’ (Inside Housing, 2015; 
2016a).  Jeremy Corbyn has also stated that a future Labour government would be 
committed to build one million new homes in five years, of which half would be in the 
council housing sector (Inside Housing, 2016b; 2016c).   
Figure 2: Annual housing output and additional households forming: 1971 to 
2016 
 
Source: DCLG (2016b), ONS (2015) 
It is a truism that there is no such thing as a national housing crisis so much as a 
complex series of overlapping and distinct local, sub-regional and regional housing 
problems that require locally mediated responses.  So where in England is the 
shortfall in supply most acute?  Using Holman’s (2011) projections of housing need 
and demand from 2011 to 2031, alongside data about regional housing completions 
(DCLG, 2012), it is possible to project forward from 2011-12 completion rates.
1
  
Figure 3 below shows that if these levels of output were maintained long term, 
shortfalls will occur in all regions, but they will be particularly acute in the South East 
and London. 
  
                                               
1
 DCLG discontinued their reporting on regional housing completions in 2011-12.  We now know that completions 
rates have increased since this time, but using 2011-12 completions data gives some continuity between the data 
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Figure 3: Regional variations in housing need/demand and future supply, 
projected from 2011-12 levels. 
 
Source: Holmans (2011), DCLG (2012) 
At a lower geographical level a more nuanced picture emerges, as proportionate 
output in different local authorities varies markedly, within as well as across regions.   
Figure 4 presents data on the number of housing completions, per capita, in certain 
local authorities (2014-15). Those listed are the authorities with the ten highest and 
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Figure 4: Local authorities in England and Wales with highest and lowest per 
capita completions (2014-15) 
Local authority Completions 
per capita 
Region Local authority Completions 
per capita 
Region 
City of London 1/50 London Blackpool 1/2007 NW 
Hinckley and 
Bosworth 
1/98 EM Reading 1/2010 SE 
North West 
Leicestershire 
1/109 EM Maldon 1/2092 East 
East Devon 1/148 SW Gravesham 1/2105 SE 
Test Valley 1/151 SE North Hertfordshire 1/2184 East 
Wychavon 1/160 WM Islington 1/2210 London 
Cambridge 1/161 East Harrow 1/2460 London 
Telford and Wrekin 1/165 WM Oxford 1/3160 SE 
Horsham 1/168 SE Haringey 1/4459 London 
Aylesbury Vale 1/168 SE Richmond upon 
Thames 
1/4840 London 
Source: DCLG (2016c), ONS (2015b) 
What such local analysis shows is that those local authorities with the highest 
outputs are not necessarily in those areas where there is most acute demand.  This 
reflects a range of local factors, such as the availability and cost of developable land 
and local planning regimes.  There is, for example, a disparity between completions 
per capita between the East Midlands and the North West: among the 100 local 
authorities with the highest housing completions per capita, just six are in the North 
West, whereas 16 are in the East Midlands.  (These regions contain comparable 
numbers of local authorities.)  However, the future growth in annual housing need 
and demand in the North West is estimated to be similar, per annum, to the East 
Midlands (Holman, 2011).  
This outline analysis suggests that the current regime for developing new housing is 
highly unlikely to stem the long standing decline in output in the face of increasing 
demand; and even then it is unlikely that the geographical distribution of new 
developments will be aligned with the distribution of the major local pressure points 
in housing supply.   
There are a range of explanations for this long-standing trend of housing 
undersupply.  Some commentators have focused on what they perceive as the 
undue restrictions within the planning system, artificially raising the price of land and 
discouraging both large-scale investments and local initiatives (Ball, 2010; Morton, 
2012; 2013).  However, this analysis does not sit easily with the practice of land 
banking, used by developers, in part to inoculate themselves against risk.  Others 
have argued that the focus on the 'numbers game' and building targets pays too little 
attention to the very inefficient use of the current housing stock - in terms of the 
number of vacant properties, second homes and, especially, under-occupied 
dwellings, in particular among elderly owner-occupiers (Dorling, 2014).  However, the 
political palatability of redistributing households and properties in the private sector to 
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ensure a better 'fit' through a mix of sticks (such as council tax surcharges) and 
carrots (such as developing equity release products) still seems rather remote. 
Even if housing supply were to be significantly increased in the next few years, it 
may not bring about the fall in property prices that would be hoped for by those 
concerned about housing (un)affordability.  There is not a linear relationship between 
an increase in output and a reduction in housing costs (Gallent, 2015).  It is therefore 
important to recognise the complexities of undertaking a comprehensive assessment 
of the reasons for low supply, and to predict what impact increased supply will have 
on housing access and affordability. 
We cannot attempt in this short report to address the full range of factors accounting 
for low levels of new homes and indicating how output could be increased.  
(However, one recent and useful overview along these lines can be found in the 
House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs (2016)).  Our intentions in this 
report are more modest.  We would contend that, in much of this debate, sufficient 
attention is rarely given to the structural changes taking place in the housebuilding 
industry itself.  These changes pre-date the 2008 financial crisis but have become 
amplified in recent years.  If we focus on this factor in housing supply, our analysis 
suggests that any national strategy which is largely dependent on the private market 
will be simply incapable of achieving the uplift needed in housing output.  In the 
following section we outline some of the distinctive characteristics of this sector, 
highlighting the trend towards consolidation in the housebuilding industry, and the 
networks of relationships set up around the housing development process. 
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3 3. Private housebuilding, land 
and the process of consolidation 
In an international context, it is something of an anomaly that UK housebuilders 
combine the functions of land acquisition and development with actual housing 
construction (Barker, 2004; Griffiths, 2011; Ball, 2003).  Although they are still 
popularly described as ‘housebuilders’, many of the biggest private firms responsible 
for housing output in the UK are, in strict business terms, land speculators first and 
housing developers second (OFT, 2008; Barker, 2004; Callcutt, 2007).  These firms 
have adopted this model as it is the best route to securing their primary objective, 
which is to ‘deliver profits to their investors’ (Callcutt, 2007: 4). 
The acquisition of land for development is critical in this enterprise.  The volatility in 
land prices creates scope for a cycle of large scale booms and busts in the sector.  
Between 2000 and 2007, for example, the value of land in England and Wales rose 
by 170 per cent, compared to an increase in house prices of 124 per cent (Griffiths, 
2011).  The greater volatility in land prices underlines the risks inherent in the 
housebuilding sector.  In a tight land market, organisations are engaged in a delicate 
forecasting exercise, competing to acquire a scarce resource, and often speculating 
on future planning consent.  They have to predict the end value of any development 
on a site, subtracting the production costs, to produce an offer to the landowner 
which builds in a profit margin (Leishman et al., 2000; Savills, 2015a).  As a result, 
housebuilders can reap large rewards, or large losses, due to unexpected 
fluctuations in house prices or inaccurate costings.  The process of forecasting end 
values compounds the likely volatility in land prices.  A study by KPMG (2008), for 
example, showed that an expected increase or decrease in houses prices of three 
per cent translates to a ten per cent increase or decrease in the land values in the 
development.   
The vagaries of making predictions about future property prices can be illustrated by 
the recent economic shock of Brexit.  There has been little consensus since then on 
whether and when and for how long property prices would fall.  Furthermore, the 
extent of the impact in specialist markets such as central London remains unclear 
and this is compounded by wider uncertainties in macro-economic forecasting about 
Britain's future position in the global economy.  It is for such reasons that the 
minimisation of risk is a central priority of all housebuilders. 
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As this pricing model plays out through the development process, housebuilders 
obviously seek to sell properties when the sale price covers their costs and the 
required profit margin.  The firm's main focus is on preserving, or if possible 
enhancing, profit margins.  This acts as a major disincentive to increase output 
significantly in times of both falling houses prices and rising house prices.  When 
prices are rising, an increase in output might lead to oversupply which will affect end 
sale prices; and selling at below projected levels in times of declining prices would 
directly jeopardise the predicted margin.  This helps to explain why supply is 
relatively inelastic to price changes (Barker, 2004; Swank et al., 2002).  
In order to guard against volatility and secure sales at predicted prices, 
housebuilders use landbanks to control the flow of new housing into local markets, 
and to strengthen their negotiating position with landowners (Barker, 2004; Griffiths, 
2011).  Where development land is in short supply, access to land through 
ownership and options contracts also enables housebuilders to act strategically 
against other firms and landowners.  As Ball (2003: 909) notes, land banks help the 
larger housebuilders ‘spread risks, lower financing costs, [and] improve negotiating 
positions with land-owners’. 
The fundamental importance of access to land leads some housebuilders to focus on 
the acquisition of smaller firms, in order to access their land banks.  This leads to a 
consolidation in the sector, and a concentration of market share by bigger firms.  In 
1960, the top ten housebuilders accounted for approximately nine per cent of all new 
housing production.  By 2004 the biggest ten firms had increased their share to 46 
per cent (Welling, 2006).  Beyond these volume housebuilders, there has been a 
pronounced shrinking in the number of SME builders.  Lyons (2014) indicated that in 
1980 there were over 10,000 SME housebuilders, building 57 per cent of all housing.  
In 2014 this had dropped to 2,800 firms delivering just 27 per cent of all output.  The 
need to acquire land has driven this process in many cases, to the detriment of 
overall housing output.  Griffiths (2011) has examined trends in housing output after 
periods of intense market consolidation.  He assessed the impact of eight big 
mergers in the sector in the 2000s, and showed that in each case output dropped 
compared to the amalgamated output before the merger.  For the firms involved, that 
is simply a by-product of following their business logic - to acquire developable land 
as cheaply as possible. 
It is not straightforward to see how this process of consolidation might be reversed, 
despite repeated government exhortations to diversify the industry and promote the 
SME sector.  In response to competition for land, and the need to secure planning 
consent to build housing, housebuilders utilise local information and unique skill and 
knowledge sets.  Adams et al (2008: 15), for example, noted how big housebuilders; 
‘retain estate agents…to bring sites to their attention.  Such agents are expected 
to know when potential development sites are likely to be marketed, who owns 
them, when any lease will expire and whether planning permission can be easily 
obtained…The local network and localised knowledge are seen as an important 
source of competitive advantage.’ 
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The presence of these networks, in conjunction with the specialist skills and 
knowledge required to secure planning permissions in the right location, at the right 
density, with an appropriate tenure mix and so on, creates a major barrier to entry for 
new firms, or existing SME builders wishing to increase their acquisition of new sites 
to build more. 
An additional factor affecting the behaviour of housebuilders is the inherent time lag 
from land acquisition to producing a marketable product.  This helps to explain why 
housing starts often do not mirror the rate of new planning permissions.  An 
examination of permissions data produced by the Local Government Association 
(2013), and data on total housing starts in England and Wales (DCLG, 2016d), 
suggests that shortly after the 2008 financial crisis permissions quickly began 
outstripping housing starts.  Recent analysis by Savills showed that this gap has 
continued to widen, with approximately 50,000 more permissions to housing starts in 
the first quarter of 2015 (Savills, 2015b). 
The motives and behaviours of large private housebuilders since the 2008 financial 
crisis have been explored by Payne (2015), drawing on interviews with senior staff 
about changes in their operating practices.  Payne claims that, in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis, these organisations were prioritising ‘cash returns’ and 
making ‘other features of speculative housebuilding, such as profit and volume 
output…secondary considerations’ (Payne, 2015: 279).  In the effort to maximise 
sales at an acceptable price, housebuilders were offering part-exchange deals, and 
selling off-plan to organisations such as housing associations to generate some 
cashflow.  To maximise prices, housebuilders were active in renegotiating their 
section 106 contributions, to reduce the number of 'affordable' homes they were 
required to provide (Mathiason et al., 2013).  
Such practices characterised the response of larger housebuilders to the immediate 
aftermath of the financial crisis, but they soon reverted to ‘prioritising margin over 
volume’ (Taylor Wimpey, 2011, in Archer and Cole, 2014).  The post-crisis strategies 
of each firm were, in part, dictated by how leveraged they were.  Those with high 
levels of debt, and capital assets tied up in land (which was decreasing in price), 
were hit particularly hard.  As Griffiths (2011) notes, those holding large land assets 
had to write-down the value of their assets, and as sales slowed in the immediate 
post-crisis period, they witnessed severe cashflow and balance sheet problems.  
Some housebuilders broke their covenants with their lenders, and had to restructure 
their debts, as lenders were reluctant to force the realisation of those assets at 
current prices.  This forbearance has meant that many firms survived by retaining 
land assets, which under other circumstances would have been repossessed.   
This response by lenders meant that firms did not bear the full costs of the 'market 
correction' provoked by the 2008 financial crisis.  As they recovered from the effects 
of the crisis, many larger housebuilders shifted their focus to building in those 
locations where prices were more resilient (Lyons, 2014; Jefferys and Lloyd, 2015), 
or to areas where planning conditions are less onerous (Payne, 2015).  This is one 
manifestation of increased risk aversion that affected how schemes were being 
appraised, where land was being acquired and how investment was reshaped.   
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This summary of the motives and actions of private firms since the 2008 crisis shows 
how new housing supply can be suppressed, as other priorities hold sway ahead of 
increasing volume.  As a result, national output can be unresponsive to changes in 
demand.  The profit margin dominates, and investment is directed to those sites and 
locations that are most likely to produce the best returns.  Of course, not everything 
required to increase volumes lies within the gift of the private housebuilder, as their 
actions and operating conditions are influenced by other factors, such as local 
planning regimes, national policy initiatives and the attitude of lenders.  A full 
discussion of how these relationships have changed in recent years lies beyond the 
scope of this report.  Nevertheless, it remains clear that the largest housebuilders 
have been adopting a more risk averse approach to their use of capital, and in their 
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 4 4. The recent performance of 
the largest housebuilders 
This understanding of the practices and operations of private housebuilding firms 
sets the context for a more thorough analysis of their performance since 2008, in 
terms of both their housing output and their financial health.  This segment of the 
overall market is of critical importance.  In 2014/15, for example, private firms were 
responsible for more than three quarters of all new housing in the UK and the ten 
biggest housebuilders were responsible for nearly half of all completions.  An 
analysis of these trends after the 2008 crisis is timely, if another downturn in the 
housing market is in prospect, following the decision to leave the European Union.  
Warnings have been given about slowdowns in housing sales and falling house 
prices (Dorling, 2016; Pickford, 2016), declines in share prices for housebuilding 
firms (Cahill, 2016), and the suspension of property funds in light of mass 
withdrawals by investors (MacAdam, 2016).  As yet, some of the more pessimistic 
predictions have not come to pass, but the full effects of Brexit are likely to take 
months if not years to work through.  Even a slight slowing down in housebuilding 
activity will make it impossible to get anywhere near to those ambitious output 
targets for 2020 and beyond.  Hence, there is value in looking at the last shock to the 
system, and its effect on the housebuilding industry, to prepare for the next one. 
We have compiled and analysed data from the annual reports of the nine biggest 
housebuilders, based on the size of their revenue in 2015.
2
  The tenth biggest 
housebuilder in the UK, Bloor Holdings, is not a publicly listed company, and hence 
information about their housing completions and financial performance is difficult to 
access.  Where appropriate the annual report data have been allied with data from 
other sources to situate their performance in the broader market place. A more 
detailed note on our data and data analysis is provided in Appendix 1. 
4.1. The disjuncture between revenue and output 
The biggest housebuilders have geared up their supply in recent years, and have 
played an important role in preventing volumes from suffering a sharp decline.
                                               
2
 In order of the size of their housebuilding revenue, starting with the largest, the following firms were studied; 
Barratt Developments PLC, Taylor Wimpey PLC, Persimmon PLC, Berkeley Group Holdings PLC, and Bellway 
PLC, Redrow Group PLC, Galliford Try PLC, Bovis Homes PLC, Crest Nicholson PLC. 
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Figure 5 shows how, in a climate of fluctuating completions overall, the largest 
private firms have consistently increased their output since 2010 
Figure 5: Housing completions for the UK, and the biggest private 
housebuilders3 
 
Source: DCLG (2016b), housebuilder annual reports  
The annual output of the biggest housebuilders is at historically high levels.  Wellings 
(2006) has shown how, among the biggest ten housebuilders, there was a steady 
increase in the number of units developed, from 14,000-16,000 in the 1960s, to a 
peak of 76,000 in 2004.  As Figure 5 shows, the top nine firms were back to reaching 
this peak level by 2015.  This trend confirms not just the scale of their activity, but 
their increasing prominence in the market.  In the 1960s the top ten housebuilders 
were responsible for 8-9 per cent of national output (Wellings, 2006).  In 2015 we 
calculate this figure to be 47 per cent, indicating considerable consolidation in the 
market.  Does this process of consolidation matter, as long as larger housebuilders 
are continuing to step up supply in the wake of the 2008 crisis?  We think it does 
matter, because these firms are more concerned to maximise returns than increase 
output as an end in itself.  There may be some reluctance to increase the production 
of a good where ongoing scarcity is proving so conducive to enhanced profitability 
per unit.   
Behind these issues of output lie some interesting financial dynamics.  In our earlier 
article, we noted how the revenues of the biggest five housebuilders grew by 40 per 
cent between 2008 and 2012, whilst completions only grew by 24 per cent over the 
same time period (Archer and Cole, 2014).  This discrepancy between revenue and 
                                               
3
 Figures for UK completions 2015-16 were not available at the time of publication, so estimates have been made 
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output has continued.  From 2012-15, a similar pattern emerged, as the five biggest 
housebuilders delivered year-on-year revenue growth of up to 22 per cent, yet the 
maximum growth in completions in one year was 11 per cent.  For this report, we 
extended the analysis to cover the biggest nine housebuilders, as shown in Figure 6.  
In simple terms, between 2012-2015 the number of dwellings completed by this 
group grew by 33 per cent.  However, the rate of increase in their revenue from 
housebuilding was more than twice this, increasing by 76 per cent.  A major 
disjuncture has emerged between income and output, and this comes into even 
sharper focus in section 4.3 below when we analyse profit before tax. 
Figure 6: Annual percentage change in the revenue and housing completions 
of the biggest 9 housebuilders 
 
Source: Housebuilder annual reports 
One of the reasons behind the difference between revenue growth and output growth 
may lie in the pricing of new housing by the biggest builders.  Figure 7 shows the 
average sale price achieved by four of the biggest five housebuilders for the period 
2008-2015.
4
  Berkeley Group, the other firm in the biggest five, has been removed as 
an outlier; as they operate largely in London, their average sale price far exceeded 
the other firms. The figure shows that the price of new products by these 
housebuilders is increasingly outstripping price growth in the wider housing market.  
This trend may therefore underpin the disproportionate growth in revenues. 
  
                                               
4
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Figure 7: Average UK house prices compared to the average sale prices of a 
selection of volume housebuilders 
 
Source: Land Registry (2016), housebuilder annual reports 
The increase in average sales prices may well reflect the decision by housebuilders 
to target locations that will generate higher end values.  This is corroborated by 
trading updates and investor presentations from these firms, which focus on land 
purchases and development in ‘better quality locations’ (Taylor Wimpey, 2014a).  
This raises a number of questions - not least, whether investment is likely to be 
directed to the lower end of the private market, and whether the growth in average 
sales prices has been fuelled in part by public subsidy.   
4.2. The geography of housing output 
Pricing trends raise further questions about the geographical distribution of housing 
by the biggest housebuilders if they have indeed targeted more favourable markets.  
However, it is notoriously difficult to assess the distribution of their output, as each 
firm uses different regional boundaries to report their activity.   
Certain conclusions can be drawn, however, not least because four of the biggest 
nine housebuilding firms operate predominantly in the south of England: Berkeley 
Group operates almost universally in London and the South East region; Crest 
Nicholson also operates predominantly in the south, with some development in the 
Midlands; Bovis Homes develop nationally but two thirds of their development in 
2015 was in the south; and approximately three quarters of Galliford Try’s 
completions in 2015, through its Linden Homes arm, was located in the south.  
Adding geographical data from the other housebuilders (excluding Redrow Group, 
where data of this type were not available) it is possible to estimate the concentration 
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25-000-30,000 of the 65,000 completions by these firms were based in London, the 
South East or the South West.
5
  Figure 8 presents this information. 




Data and boundary notes 
Barratts  7,183 Total completions labelled 'London', 'South' (the boundary for 
which includes most of the South East and parts of Norfolk), 
and 'West' (which largely mirrors the South West 
administrative boundary). 
Taylor Wimpey 5,737 Total completions in the South East, South West and London 
offices of their 'South' division. The South West boundary 
covers parts of south Wales.  Full year completions modelled 
on half year results. 
Persimmon 7,084 Total completions by their 'South Division', which in addition to 
London, the South East and South West includes certain shire 




3,355 Development almost universally in the South East and 
London administrative boundaries, though some 
developments in the south Midlands. 
Bellway 4,056 Total completions for their 'South' division, which comprises 
the administrative areas of London, the South East and South 
West, but also includes southerly parts of the East of England 
and south Wales. 
Galliford Try 2,111 Total completions for Linden Homes in their 'South of 
England' division. Completions in the Midlands have been 
deducted. 
Bovis 2,784 Total completions for their 'South' division, which comprises 
the administrative areas of London, the South East and South 
West, but also includes southerly parts of the East of England. 
Crest Nicolson 2,725 Total completions by all divisions, which cover all of the South 
East and London administrative boundaries, with some 
activity in the West Midlands. 
Total 32,310  
Source: Housebuilder annual reports 
There is some evidence that this concentration of activity in three of the nine English 
regions is starting to dissipate, and that the three largest housebuilders are starting 
to 'move North'.  In some divisions in Barratts, Taylor Wimpey and Persimmon, 
recent growth in output was higher in the north than in the south.  For example, the 
central division within Barratts, which covers the West Midlands and North West of 
England, registered a 75 per cent increase in output between 2011-15.  This 
                                               
5
 This figure can only be an approximation as the split of completions by Crest Nicholson does not reveal the total 
for their Midlands activity.  Furthermore, ‘southern’ completions data for Persimmon and Taylor Wimpey includes 
some completions in the Midlands, East of England and Wales.  The figure for southern completions by Taylor 
Wimpey has had to be modelled on half year results (Taylor Wimpey, 2015) information as this was the only 
geographical data available.    
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compared with a 43 per cent increase in their ‘Southern’ region.  Similarly, 
Persimmon has shifted from a position where a minority of completions were based 
in the ‘North’ in 2012, to a majority of completions being located here in 2015.   
The data reveal a shift in the strategy among big housebuilders, which may have 
been influenced in part by higher land costs in the south, and more receptive local 
authorities in less pressurised markets in the North.  The decisions of such firms 
about where they build are being driven by their underlying business logic and their 
access to land.  This does not necessarily bear a close relationship to the 
geographical distribution of the areas across England with the most acute housing 
demand.  It remains to be seen how far the government's recently announced 
measure on 'low supply' areas (see Chapter 6) will mitigate this trend.  
4.3. Profit: understanding normal activity and net returns 
In our previous paper we noted how the biggest housebuilders had moved from 
incurring losses in the immediate post-crisis environment to accruing sizeable profits 
by 2013 (Archer and Cole, 2014).  It is not always clear what the term 'profit' refers to.  
Profit after all costs and other deductions is clearly different to profit before tax (PBT), 
but PBT calculated before exceptional items can look very different to PBT after 
these items are added.  This is particularly relevant in an analysis of the accounts of 
large housebuilders following the crisis.  Large ‘impairments’ were included in their 
accounts, particularly in 2009, which reduced the value of their land and other assets.  
Calculating PBT in a way which includes these items gives a sense of the current 
financial health of the company, but it may conceal the underlying profitability (or 
otherwise) of their normal functions (Cambridge University Press, 2011).  We have 
therefore assessed profitability before exceptional items are included and also before 
any financing costs.  In addition, we have sought to isolate the PBT associated 
purely with each firm's housebuilding activity in the UK, since a number undertake 
various commercial developments and housebuilding in other countries.  
An analysis of this information shows a staggering rise in the profits before tax (PBT) 
of the biggest housebuilders.  Between 2010 and 2015, the biggest five 
housebuilders saw their PBT (before exceptional items) rise by 473 per cent, 
and the biggest nine firms saw an increase of 489 per cent in their PBT.  In their 
normal housebuilding functions, these firms are remarkable generators of profit.  And 
whilst this analysis focuses on PBT generated from UK housebuilding activity, these 
firms have generated revenue from other sources. Looking at PBT after all revenue, 
the growth in their profitability is even more pronounced.  The extent to which any of 
these surpluses were used to fund a cycle of reinvestment to increase housing 
volumes is explored in the next section.  
If the 'normal functions' of these firms were generating profit, what about the net 
positions after tax, exceptional items and other costs were taken into account at the 
end of each year?  In the immediate aftermath of the recession, some firms suffered 
big net losses (such as Taylor Wimpey in 2008).  However, other firms remained 
profitable throughout, such as the Berkeley Group.  Most of the biggest five firms 
were hit by heavy financing costs in 2008 and 2009.  When impairments for falling 
land values are included, this created negative year end positions.  Nonetheless, this 
group of firms had collectively achieved over £372m in end of year profits by 2010, 
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and this had risen sharply to over £2bn by 2015.  This represents a near 500 per 
cent increase in end of year profits between 2010 and 2015, after taxation and other 
impairments have been taken into account.  The suggestion, by the then Housing 
Minister in 2011, that the housebuilding industry had been ‘brought to its knees’ 
(Shapps, 2011) by the 2008 financial crisis is somewhat wide of the mark.  There 
was a more varied picture for the biggest firms, both in the impact of the recession 
and in the speed at which they returned to profitability. 
The performance of the largest housebuilders between 2010 and 2015 can be 
summarised as follows: for the biggest five firms, housing completions rose by 48 per 
cent, housebuilding revenue increased by 103 per cent, while housebuilding profit 
before tax (PBT) increased by 473 per cent, and end of year total profits increased 
by 484 per cent.  In short, the rate of growth in profit is ten times the rate of increase 
in completions. 
4.4. Dividends: lost potential for investment? 
As profits among large housebuilders have risen sharply in the past five years, the 
distribution of these surpluses merits comment, especially given the widespread 
concerns about undersupply.  In the aftermath of recession, one firm chose to forgo 
paying dividends so it could reinvest in its core activities.  The Berkeley Group’s 
annual report in 2010 declared: 
‘…the greatest value will be achieved through land acquisition, investing in work 
in progress and opportunistic share purchases, as opposed to declaring a 
dividend’ (Berkeley Group, 2010: 3) 
The strategies of the largest firms have changed markedly since then.  As the 
recession has faded, an increasing proportion of annual profits has been transferred 
back to investors, rather than being reinvested to boost output, as shown in Figure 9.  
In 2015, the biggest five housebuilders returned 43 per cent of their yearly profits to 
shareholders, an amount totalling £936m, raising questions about the potential 
volume of new supply that could have been provided, had the firms followed a 
stronger reinvestment strategy. 
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Figure 9: Yearly dividends for the biggest five housebuilders as a share of 
profits for the year 
 
Source: Housebuilder annual reports 
Working backwards from the figure of £936m, the total value of dividend payments 
made in 2015 by the biggest five housebuilders, we can estimate the lost potential 
from this transfer of assets.  Taking an 'average housebuilding cost per plot' of £52k 
in 2015 (Barratts, 2015: 25), we can use KPMG’s breakdown of development costs 
(KPMG, 2008) to estimate development costs per unit to be approximately £104k.  If 
this rough average cost is applied to all five of the biggest housebuilders, then the 
£936m they transferred out in dividends in 2015 could have funded an additional 
output of nearly 9,000 dwellings.  This would constitute six per cent of total national 
output in 2015.   
Of course, it can be argued that investors input their capital which, in part, enables 
those firms to build, and on that basis are legitimate in demanding a return.  But even 
if one is sympathetic to this argument, our analysis shows how housing output is 
hostage to the interests of shareholders in these firms.  The level of output of our 
biggest housebuilders turns on these strategic decisions about reinvestment or 
divestment. 
The trends outlined here, in terms of revenue, profit, completions and the transfer of 
assets through dividends, will continue through 2016.  This will certainly be the case 
if the immediate impact of Brexit on the housing market proves less severe than 
initially expected.  The recently declared half year results for Persimmon Homes (up 
to end of June 2016) are a case in point.  Compared to the first half year for 2015, 
profit before tax increased 29 per cent (to £352.3m); revenue increased by 12 per 
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homes sold) (Persimmon PLC, 2016)6.  Similarly, the results for Barratt Homes for 
the year ending in June 2016 showed that profit before tax was up by 20.7 per cent 
on 2014/15 (to £682.3m), revenue increased by 13 per cent (to £4.23bn) and total 
completions were up by just 5.3 per cent (to 17,319) (Barratt Developments PLC, 
2016).  These are stark differences of scale, even allowing for time lags around 
completions. 
 
                                               
6
 Persimmon Homes has also attracted considerable publicity over a proposed £600m-plus payout, which would 
rank as one of the most generous bonus schemes the City has ever seen.  Persimmon is set to award a big slice 
of shares to its senior team under a long-term incentive plan put in place three years ago.  It will ultimately result 
in a total of 30m shares being awarded to the company’s 135 top managers by the end of 2021.  It is likely to 
amount to a payment of over £100 million to the Chief Executive Jeff Fairburn. (Ficenec, 2015) 
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5 5. Focussing on demand - the 
case of Help to Buy 
In 2013 the introduction of the Help to Buy programme by the Coalition Government 
caused economists to assess any possible repercussions on the wider housing 
market.  Sir Stephen Nickell, during a Treasury Select Committee meeting, posed 
and answered a set of fundamental questions: 
‘…is it just going to drive up house prices? By and large, in the short run the 
answer to that is yes. But in the medium term will the increased house prices 
stimulate more house building? ...probably…a bit. But the historical evidence 
suggests not very much’. (Nickell, in Liszewski, 2013) 
These words have been largely prophetic.  Help to Buy was devised to provide a 
stimulus to the housebuilding market by increasing the supply of housing through the 
building of more new homes (Finlay et al., 2016).  Contrary to the suggestion in this 
statement, the programme has not subsidised the creation of that supply directly, or 
directly subsidised housebuilders to build.  It was in fact an avowedly political gesture 
to ease the path for those potential first time buyers unable to get their fabled 'foot on 
the housing ladder' thorough the normal operation of the housing market.  The equity 
loans component of Help to Buy enabled those who could not access a mortgage to 
do so by supplementing their minimum five per cent deposit with a 20 per cent equity 
loan.  The mortgage guarantee element (to be discontinued) provides reassurances 
to mortgage lenders in the event of a default, to encourage more lending.   
It is therefore not clear how the Help to Buy programme can, or will, affect any major 
changes in the underlying dynamics of the housebuilding process discussed earlier 
in this report.  However, the programme has made an impact on overall new housing 
supply, with an evaluation suggesting it has stimulated an increase in national supply 
by 14 per cent (Finlay et al., 2016). It is also clear that housing offered through Help 
to Buy is generally at ‘the lower end of the price spectrum’ (NAO, 2014: 9), perhaps 
offsetting concerns about those on moderate incomes being priced out of new 
housing. 
For the biggest housebuilding firms, Help to Buy has been an important intervention.  
Using information from the government’s evaluation of the programme (Finlay et al.,
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2016) and other statistics about equivalent programmes in Wales (Welsh 
Government, 2016) and Scotland (Scottish Government, 2016),
7
 we estimate that in 
2014 at least 50 per cent of all the equity loans made in the UK related to sales by 
just five of the biggest nine housebuilders.  In 2014, Help to Buy sales constituted 53 
per cent of all Taylor Wimpey’s completions (Taylor Wimpey, 2014b), 40 per cent of 
Persimmon's, and 31 per cent of Barratts' (Finlay et al., 2016).  This intervention 
represents, indeed is intended to represent, a distortion of the market, but this can 
have less favourable consequences too.  Studies suggest that there is a strong 
relationship between increased mortgage lending and house prices, such that the 
volume of mortgages through Help to Buy has stimulated a three per cent price 
increase nationally (Shelter, 2015). 
But what of the impact on the finances and pricing of housing by the biggest builders?  
One might hypothesise that Help to Buy provided cashflow stability to the biggest 
firms, enabling them to remain disciplined on the pricing of their other units.  As seen 
in Figure 6, the average sale prices of the biggest firms are increasingly 
outperforming the average price for all residential sales nationally, which would 
suggest that Help to Buy has not led them to moderate their prices on other products.  
There is certainly evidence in their annual reports, and in national evaluations, that 
the programme has stimulated new demand to which those firms have responded 
with higher volumes.  However, there is also considerable evidence of switching from 
'normal' market housing to Help to Buy products, making any output gains less than 
would have been anticipated. It seems that the big housebuilders are increasingly 
dependent on Help to Buy to prop up demand for their products, and are therefore 
highly susceptible to changes in associated government policy (Elder, 2016) 
The question that cannot be answered at this stage is whether such interventions 
represent both good value for money for the taxpayer, as well as an effective 
mechanism to increase housing supply.  Much depends on the future performance of 
the housing market.  Comparisons with other government housing interventions raise 
important questions.  The government’s Affordable Homes Programme (AHP) 2011-
15, created 186,000 housing units for the £4.5bn of public expenditure (Cross, 2015).  
By March 2016, the £3.5bn of government liabilities, generated by Help to Buy 
(equity loans), had supported the development of 81,000 units of housing (DCLG, 
2016e).  Clearly there are considerations about additionality and deadweight effects 
beyond what would have happened anyway.  Time will tell whether the approach of 
guaranteeing debt, and taking on liabilities in the form of equity, will deliver the 
projected returns.  Little attention seems to have been paid as yet to the external 
effects of such interventions on pricing in the wider market, as well as any net gains 
in housing output. 
                                               
7
 This uses 2014 data for the year 2014 in England and financial year 2014-15 for Wales and Scotland. 
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6 6. A shift towards supply-side 
interventions? 
In the course of finalising this report, distinct signs have emerged that the 
government may be changing course from the insistent demand-side emphasis in 
housing policy that marked the 'Osborne' years from 2010 to 2016 in the Coalition 
and Conservative administrations.  A series of housing initiatives were announced at 
the Conservative Party conference in October 2016.   These included:  
A Home Building Fund.  This involves combining several existing schemes (the 
Builders Finance Fund, the large sites infrastructure programme and the Build to 
Rent fund) and an additional £1.15 billion of previously unannounced loan finance.  
This amounts to £3 billion overall.  £2 billion will be devoted to long-term funding for 
infrastructure and £1 billion for small and custom builders.  Housing associations will 
be able to bid to the fund.  The fund will run until 2021.  The announcement about 
the Fund suggested that it would enable 25,000 new homes to be built by 2020 and 
an additional 225,000 new homes overall (see Inside Housing, 2016d).   
The Accelerated Construction programme.  This will involve a partnership 
between the government and investors and contractors to speed up development on 
public land and target the use of off-site construction and new models of building. 
The government estimates that this fund will enable 15,000 new homes to be built by 
2020.   
A focus on 'low demand, high supply' areas.  In response to some of the marked 
geographical imbalances in the housing starts across the country (see Chapter 2 of 
this report) the government has identified 100 local authority areas where there is a 
'massive' gap between local housing supply and demand.  In these areas, 
predominantly in the South-east, the Housing Minister Gavin Barwell has announced 
that he will 'work with these places and find out what is happening and work with 
them to deliver [an improvement].' (Inside Housing 2016e)  
These initiatives, and possibly further measures, are likely to be spelt out in more 
detail in the forthcoming Autumn Statement and in a White Paper later in the year. 
The announcement of the above measures met with a broadly positive initial 
response across the housing sector, though clearly more detail will be necessary 
before a proper assessment can be made.  However, on the basis of our report, 
several issues will need to be taken into account in order to judge whether the new 
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programmes are going to have the impact on housing output that the government 
anticipates. First, it is unlikely that these measures alone will dent the modus 
operandi of the major housebuilders outlined in this report, and they will remain 
responsible for the larger part of housing output in the country.  Profits will continue 
to trump output.  Second, small and custom builders will not necessarily be ready to 
benefit from any support for access to loan finance and this will take some time to 
work through: much of the SME sector has not recovered from the 2008 crash and 
many of those involved then have either retired or downscaled their level of activity 
since.  It will take sustained encouragement for them to re-enter the market in many 
parts of the country.  Third, while many larger housing associations, notably the G15 
group of London housing associations, are keen to enhance their development 
programmes, it remains to be seen how attractive any new loan conditions will be for 
them and how large their role will be compared to the private sector. Fourth, there 
has been no reference by the government to the potential role of local authorities in 
increasing their housebuilding activity, for example, if borrowing constraints were to 
be eased.  Councils still seem to be a cast as part of the problem - through presiding 
over slow or restrictive planning regimes - rather than as part of the solution.  We 
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7 7. Conclusion 
This report has undertaken a partial analysis of one aspect of housing supply - the 
domination of the largest housebuilding firms in the sector and the extent to which 
increases in revenue and, especially, profits have outstripped the rate of growth in 
output since the 2008 financial crisis.  Our analysis concurs with the conclusion of 
the recent House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs inquiry (House of 
Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs, 2016) in their assessment of the 
housebuilding sector: 'the government must recognise the inability of the private 
sector, as currently incentivised, to build the number of homes needed (p.5)'. As the 
Prime Minster has recently suggested that government will intervene in dysfunctional 
markets (May, 2016), one could argue that the market for housebuilding should be 
first in line. 
The failure of the private housebuilding sector to build in sufficient quantity is not, it 
should be noted, some kind of temporary aberration, while the exigencies of the 
2008 financial crisis continue to work through the system.  This failure is of long 
standing and is indeed integral to the business model that major housebuilders work 
with.  The model of forecasting end values, and protecting profit margins, has 
restricted the extent of discounting that firms could undertake.  And housebuilding is 
not immune to the trend of the remorseless financialisation of the British, and indeed 
global, economy, creating an environment in which what is produced becomes less 
important than the leverage it enables for profit maximisation and securitisation 
(Aalbers, 2015; Gamble, 2014; van der Zwan, 2014).   
This tendency has been well captured by John Kay in his outstanding account of the 
aftermath of the financial crash (Kay, 2015).  Kay shows how the twin functions of 
search (property development through new sites and refurbishment) and stewardship 
(holding property as long-term investments) in capital allocations in the property 
sector have started to crumble, and become eclipsed by the trade in securities on 
existing houses, infrastructure or businesses.  In this world, it is not the number of 
houses built that counts, it is the financial opportunities that arise from this output.  
This process produces an outcome of 'contrived scarcity' (Standing 2016) in housing8.  
It is not an inevitable feature of the housing system. 
                                               
8
 'Scarcity may be natural, as in the case of truffles..but in modern capitalism scarcity is more often contrived, 
because a minority possesses all or most of an asset, because rules make it hard to produce or sell, or demand 
is deliberately stoked to outstrip supply' (Standing, 2016)  
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This process of financialisation, in which maximising shareholder returns takes 
precedence over increasing output or improving productivity, is, of course, not unique 
to the housebuilding industry (Archer and Cole, 2014).  However, the ramifications of 
this emphasis on realising profits rather than maximising investment carries 
particular force in housing – not least for households struggling to gain access to 
affordable housing, those living in overcrowded and poor quality properties, and the 
increasing number of households experiencing homelessness.   
There is not a direct alignment between the demand for housing and housing supply, 
both in terms of where new homes are built, and the prices they command.  To buy a 
Barratt’s property in 2015 at their average sale price, for example, one would need a 
household income of around £60k, on the basis of a mortgage four times annual 
earnings - well beyond the means of most middle and low income households, 
unless they have access to other funds (such as 'the bank of Mum and Dad').  Given 
the structural nature of the business logics followed by the biggest housebuilders, 
what scope is there for government intervention to raise output through initiatives 
such as Help to Buy?  The cost to the public purse of the Help to Buy programme 
depends in part on the future performance of the housing market, where any 
predictions are hazardous at the best of times, but especially when having to take 
account of the long-run effects, large or small, of Brexit.  Help to Buy has so far 
generated a 14 per cent increase in supply (Finlay et al., 2016), which is well short of 
the fundamental uplift in output that is required.  The risk with demand-side initiatives 
of any kind is that they end up simply subsidising households to afford high prices, 
and for a temporary period.  They can bring a short-term political dividend more 
readily than a significant long-term shift in increased supply.  
As shown in Chapter 6, the Government has recently announced a series of new 
measures, including the £3 billion Home Building Fund, part of which is to be 
targeted at small and medium sized developers. This intervention seems to be 
founded on the assumption that access to finance is the major barrier to increasing 
supply from this part of the housebuilding industry.  However, the barriers to 
increasing supply are multifaceted, and any attempt to achieve a major uplift in 
supply by 2020 will require a systematic and comprehensive approach. This would 
cover a range of factors hindering supply, including the control and supply of land, 
capacity and, not least, incentivising private firms to reinvest their surpluses and stop 
drip-feeding supply onto the market.  But at least this package of measures opens 
the door to the kind of supply side focus that has been notably absent from the 
government's policy agenda up to now. 
What does not seem to be on the government's agenda, however, is to introduce 
measures that would produce a major uplift in building by local authorities, housing 
associations and other non-profit bodies who make up the variegated world of 
community-led development (Heywood et al, 2016). Detailed economic appraisals 
(such as Capital Economics, 2016) have argued that this policy will help head off the 
unsustainable growth in welfare expenditure. Nevertheless, increasing the output of 
these non-profit organisations will not be a straightforward process.  Many local 
authorities may not have the capacity and appetite to begin building again.  For their 
part, major housing associations are currently caught between government 
exhortations to build for home ownership and the drive from financial regulators such 
as credit rating agencies to concentrate on social rented housing, to keep leverage 
down, as Dame Kate Barker recently pointed out (House of Lords Select Committee, 
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2016: para 59).  A stimulus to these vehicles for housebuilding would also need 
complementary action on the supply and release of land.  
Nevertheless, there is scope within the government's grasp to do much more to 
increase public sector building, if there is the political will.  This could involve 
measures over the use of reserves, rent policy, borrowing restrictions and moving 
the balance of housing subsidy away from demand and towards supply.  A wide 
range of economists have advised the government to borrow for sustainable 
infrastructural investment (for a recent summary, see Zhenghelis, 2016).  There is 
little reason why borrowing to invest in housing should be exempt from this process.  
The House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs (2016) recently 
concluded that, without an uplift in the contribution of local authorities and housing 
associations to housing supply, it would not be possible to build the number of 
houses required in the next few years.  The relaxation of the government's previous 
fiscal strategy to generate a surplus by 2020 provides a window of opportunity.  It 
would be extraordinary to continue to ignore this policy option, if a serious attempt is 
going to be made to achieve stated building targets by 2020 and beyond.  On the 
basis of the evidence in this report about the structure, organisation and recent 
financial performance of the major housebuilders, the private sector alone will simply 
continue to fail to provide the homes that are needed, and the gap between housing 
demand and supply will continue to grow larger. 
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Appendix 1: Technical notes 
on the data and analysis 
Section four above draws on information extracted from eight years of annual reports, from 
the nine housebuilders with the biggest yearly revenues in 2015.  As noted above, the tenth 
biggest housebuilder, Bloor Holdings, was excluded from the study on the grounds that, as a 
limited company, accessing information about their housing output and other financial 
performance would be difficult.  
The information extracted from these housebuilding firms is largely confined to; their housing 
completions, revenues or earnings, profits, dividends, and their participation in the 
government’s Help to Buy scheme.   It is sufficient to say that, as those firms use different 
reporting conventions, and with some operating complex group structures, significant effort 
was required to ensure data comparability.  This was aided, in terms of the financial data at 
least, by firms stated compliance with accounting procedures, such as the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  Nonetheless, for each of the data fields above, 
certain considerations became apparent: 
Completions 
The UK government defines a ‘housing completion’ as ‘a dwelling…ready for occupation or 
when a completion certificate is issued’ (DCLG, 2013).  It is difficult to know whether, in 
reporting their output, housebuilders apply the government’s this definition strictly.  For one 
firm, Berkeley Group, in certain reports this information is difficult to locate and a variety of 
phrases, such as ‘units sold’, are used to describe their output.  For the purposes of this 
analysis we have had to assume that the governments definition is largely the one applied.  
One of the firms studied operates outside of the UK, and others undertake both 
housebuilding and commercial development.  In light of this, for each firm we sought to 
isolate the data pertaining only to their UK housebuilding activity. This is in terms of both 
completions and financial performance (see below).  Extracting information about the 
geographical location of each firm’s output was much more difficult.  Maps and boundary 
descriptions, provided in the annual reports, where used to make rough assessments of their 
regional output.  Over time, for certain firms, their geographical reporting changed making it 
difficult to create time series data. For instance, Persimmon in 2012 appear to combine their 
figures for their south and central regional offices.  Despite these difficulties, rough 
geographies could be established, particularly to isolate changes in output from north to 
south or vice versa. 
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Revenue  
In assessing the revenues of the nine firms, we have tried to isolate housebuilding revenue 
from other income sources, using segmental analysis in the annual reports.  Where firms 
reported commercial development and other trading separately, this was relatively 
straightforward.  However, for others we had to establish non-housing income and subtract it 
from total earnings.  The same principle was used for revenue generated outside the UK, for 
instance by Taylor Wimpey, so that the revenue reported only relates to UK housing. 
Profit before Tax 
As noted in section four, we have looked at a specific form of Profit before Tax (PBT), which 
is calculated before exceptional items, in order to throw light on the ‘normal activities’ and 
functioning of these businesses.  As with revenue, the segmental analysis was used to 
isolate PBT for UK housebuilding/residential development, where those firms reported any 
other revenue generating activity. In trying to achieve some comparability across the firms, 
the PBT data collected was profit before financing costs, and other impairments or debt 
restructuring.  Where profit from joint ventures was not included in these figures, this was 
added back in since reporting on housing completions tended to include this output. For 
certain firms it became unclear, after 2012, whether exceptional items were being included in 
their PBT, but efforts were made to identify such exceptional items.  In calculating change in 
PBT over time, we selected years when, as a group, they posted positive values.  
Profit/loss for the year  
To ensure data comparability for ‘net’ profit or loss, we used the figures generally reported 
as ‘profit/loss for the year’, after exceptional items and discontinued operations.  For those 
firms engaged in international housebuilding, or commercial developments, this figure 
includes any profits from such activities.  The segmentation analysis in the annual reports 
enables the identification of revenue and PBT specifically for UK housebuilding, but not for 
profit/losses for the year.  
Dividends 
The value of dividends paid by each firm was identified in their consolidated cashflow 
statements, generally under the heading ‘dividends paid to Company’s shareholders’.  This 
related to actual payments, rather than projected dividend payments which are often 
discussed in annual reports.  This analysis was only performed on the biggest five firms. 
HTB 
The government’s evaluation (Finlay et al., 2016) provided valuable information on the 
quantity and value of Help to Buy equity loans for the nine firms studied here.  To 
supplement this information, relevant data was also extracted from 2014 and 2015 annual 
reports, which served to cross check the information in the government’s evaluation.  
Unfortunately, there was large variation, across the nine firms, in terms of their reporting 
about completions linked to Help to Buy.  This hindered the scope of analysis.  As with any 
analysis of secondary data from different sources, there are questions about comparability, 
and whether one is comparing ‘apples with apples’.  As can be seen above, significant effort 
was made to understanding the underlying definitions and measures being used in each 
firm's reports 
 
 
 
 
 
